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Commonwealth v. Jones, 10 Bush. (Ky.) 725; Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 
163, 168, 169. But cf. Slate v. Jones, 82 N. C. 685. 

Eminent Domain — Compensation — Waterway Constructed by City 
through Railway's Right of Way Necessitating Structural Changes. — 
A city constructed a canal, with walks on either side, through the right of way 
of a railroad, in order to join certain lakes used for recreation purposes by its 
inhabitants. This made it necessary for the railroad to build a bridge. Held, 
that the railroad is entitled to compensation for the value of the land taken 
but not for the cost of building and maintaining the bridge. Chicago, M. &" 
St. P. Ry. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 34 Sup. Ct. 400. 

For a discussion of the distinction between taking property under the em- 
inent domain power and under the police power, see Notes, p. 664. 

Equity — Jurisdiction — Right to Enjoin a Threatened Criminal 
Prosecution against a Third Party. — A statute forbade the shipment by 
any one, or the receipt for shipment by carriers, of unpasteurized cream to be 
carried more than sixty-five miles. The business of the complainant, a dairy 
company, which depended on the receipt of cream from farmers more than 
sixty-five miles distant, was thereby being ruined because the farmers and rail- 
road company were afraid to ship. Plaintiff, on the ground that the statute was 
unconstitutional, sought to enjoin the railroad from refusing to accept goods 
consigned to him, and also to restrain the Attorney-General from prosecuting 
for breach of the statute. Held, that equity will not enjoin a criminal proceed- 
ing directed against a party other than the petitioner, nor will the railroad 
company be enjoined from refusing to accept goods offered. Milton Dairy Co. 
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 144 N. W. 764 (Minn.). 

Whether the court should have refused to grant an injunction against the 
railroad is not entirely free from doubt. It is usually held that a railroad can- 
not justify a refusal to serve by pleading an unconstitutional statute. Southern 
Express Co. v. Rose, 124 Ga. 581, 53 S. E. 185. It may be contended therefore 
that the railroad, in signifying its unwillingness to receive shipments, was threat- 
ening torts involving irreparable injury to the plaintiff, and should be enjoined. 
However that may be, the court squarely held that, whether or no the statute 
was constitutional, it would not restrain the Attorney-General from prosecut- 
ing the shippers and the railroad unless the injunction was demanded by the 
persons threatened with prosecution. For a discussion of whether irreparable 
damage to one's business relations gives a right to enjoin the prosecution of 
someone else under an unconstitutional statute, see Notes, p. 668. 

Evidence — General Principles and Rules of Exclusion — Repairs 
after Injury as Proof of Causation and Possibility of Prevention. — 
The defendant operated an irrigation canal across the plaintiff's land. To 
show that his orchard was injured by an enlargement of the canal, and that 
the seepage could have been prevented by cementing the sides, the plaintiff 
offered evidence of subsequent repairs which had stopped the damage. Held, 
that the evidence is admissible. Jensen v. Davis and Weber, etc. Co., 137 Pac. 
635 (Utah). 

It is quite well settled that evidence of subsequent repairs cannot be used 
to show negligence. It is irrelevant, inasmuch as taking precautions for the 
future is not an admission of culpability in the past; and its admission is against 
public policy in that it would deter owners from remedying defects. Aldrich 
v. Concord & M. R. R., 67 N. H. 250, 29 Atl. 408. In the principal case 
the evidence is relevant on both the issues for which it was offered. Proof 
that the damage began and ended with the uncemented condition of the canal 
is convincing both as to causation and as to whether there was a practicable